It was designed to break the will of the population and force the Churchill to sue for peace. In order for SOF to best contribute to operations within the human domain I assert that we have to do two things: 1) ensure our doctrine and concepts support a more nuanced and dynamic approach to operations at the conceptual level and, 2) mimic at the operational and strategic levels the same kinds of things that make us special at the tactical level. [xvii] One example of formulaic metaphor found within military doctrine is the formula for combat power. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Its antithesis is post-positivism, or, as many prefer to call it- especially within the military- critical realism. The bureaucracy loves its metrics. But- point taken- and agree. Those of us from the old UW days call it simply the guerrilla Darwinian principle of survival in order to fight another day or what today is called simply "staying power". Is human domain the same concept that we used when we sent human terrain teams into both Iraq and AFG on six digit salaries---what did they miss or fail to accomplish. Sabotage can be done by Cyber types. It cannot, however, lead to certainty about future outcomes.. In other words, the mission has only one solution: make local/paramilitary forces more lethal and reform local governance to distribute the political and economic power so that X does not consolidate power in the resulting imbalance that our support would createi.e. The fires warfighting function as defined by the Army includes the following tasks: Deliver fires, integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires, and conduct targeting. That is, unconventional tactics (e.g. The difficulty now in returning to UW or what you call SW is that there is a distinct lack of SF training personnel deeply grounded experience wise in UW---so much of what is being transferred is just from the recent wars. C. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Did we have PME classes using insurgent battle videos released via the internet to give deploying personnel the necessary understanding of the ideology driving the various insurgent groups---no not really because we declared them propaganda and refused to engage. [xxxix] To engage most effectively within the human domain- our SW forces should be supported with an education and training institution second to none. This requires that we facilitate (1) the unhinging of these states and societies from their current and often age-old way of life and way of governance and (2) the attachment of these countries and populations to ways of life and ways of governance which are more similiar to our own. Thank you for the listing and your comments. Ah, now I see where we are talking past one another. Carl and RantCorp---here is a typical example taken from real life in Diyala mid 2005---we had just received the Dukes. commanders to balance their command and control duties, Four Tips to Help You Prepare for the Army Warrior Leader Course, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM): 10 Cool Facts, and Army Trial Counselor in a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade: My Experience, Army 18F MOS: Special Forces Operations & Intelligence Sergeant, 7 Great Military Tactics And Strategies That Worked. SF majors who are not selected to be S-3 operations officers for a Group (brigade-level organization) are rarely considered competitive for tactical command, however SF Groups do not fight as Groups, normally SF fights as teams. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters those threats. [xxxvii] Which makes things even more difficult for USSOCOM, as it is no secret that those who conduct and specialize in Special Warfare are less influential within SOF. For all the efforts at "understanding the culture" of the environments we are working it failed and I mean totally failed because we did not "understand the culture of the enemy". AND by the way such in house on post training does not cost an arm and a leg to conduct. most important function is to build and maintain a complete, up-to-date copy of the blockchain database. I like your example of Lee and the South using his understanding of the "human domain": influence the population to put pressure on the President. The art of Special Warfare is a creative use of special groups of professionals who are educated and trained to see things from multiple perspectives, to critically think about ones institutions flawed view of the world, create something new that is highly context-dependent across the resource spectrum, and learns while doing. That Special Operations is just now getting around in my opinion to being in the same boat is a reflection of two occurrences: the 1987 establishment of Special Operations as a 4-star command and the large growth in Special Operations since 9/11. Actually making these things happen in the face of the current drawdown, our relatively recent infatuation with technology and the inexplicable application of physical domain concepts to the human domain, however, will be a herculean task. What happens when the local populations finally after being brutually held down and are afraid to even come out of their houses DOES come out of their houses fully armed and willing to defend their villages/towns/cities? One way arguably leads towards relatively bigger budgets, more technology and platforms, and more intertwining of systems and processes with conventional forces. Likewise, the concept that the Air Force and Navy dont have anything to do with humans borders on the fantastical. IA also includes the sub-function Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, AMD, and joint fires through the targeting process. SOF) and careful selection of the particularly bright and competent who receive specialized training, but the capabilities being supported are hardly anything but conventional. [xvi] See Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in action. Although this is a simplification and perhaps disingenuous, one way of thinking about the two types of domains is to imagine an armored division battle as being one largely within the land domain. The sublime for Curtis White is about art. I dont ever remember reading anything where General Lee thought he could defeat and outright destroy the Army of the Potomac so his chosen course of action was one based on influencing the power base, the northern citizenry correct? The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) So while our enemy understands us, I believe that we have a hard time understanding them insofar as we dont know how to defeat them. One example is moving forces to execute a large-scale air or airborne assault. [ix] Sacolick, Bennet S. & Grigsby, Wayne W, Jr., Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in Prevent, Shape, Win, Army Magazine, JUN 2012, 39-40. He graduated from The Citadel, has an MBA from George Mason University, and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies. The higher levels, however, are filled with officers and senior NCOs who have been institutionalized and are largely influenced- both consciously and largely unconsciously- by the bureaucracys systems and processes. His story was we had been hitting you on every patrol and on this particular day a gun truck patrol came by and I detonated--but nothing happened which was strange as they had always worked---kept trying and then when the last truck went by it detonated. He has served in Korea, Afghanistan and South America. I also agree with your thoughts on how we misunderstand our enemy. how much does a company pay for h1b visa. "Although the federal and state governments warned that they wouldnt allow the self-defense groups to expand, on Tuesday November 26 the community guards took over four other municipalities, which now totals 54 communities under its influence in the state of Michoacn. As in Michoacn, the human, urban and rural communities are realizing that existing institutions, overwhelmed by all kinds of problems, are non-functional and that organized citizens must take in their hand the management of resources, key decisions, justice, food production, education, prevention and so on. To illustrate how the MIE multiplier might augment the guerrillas effectiveness lets take a senior Haqqani Network (HN) commander who has designs on attacking a position in or near Khost, Paktia AF. I suggest we too may benefit by inserting a MIE multiplier into our MDMP. Interesting assessment on what I'm calling asymmetric surveillance approaches and much more. The command and control WFF consists of the command and control tasks and the command and control system. As for warfighting potential, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) asserts a rather broad utility for offensive cyber operations. The human domain, a conceptualization of the influence that populations have on military operations, is one way of viewing reality. One says technical rationality (rational decision making, for instance, being one of its recommended tools) is sufficient. Art isnt something one does while coloring within the lines and SOF shouldnt be looking for a methodology to assist us with it. Standardization serves a purpose in a large organization but it is stifling in small groups. For them, uncertainty is a threat; its admission a sign of weakness. The other says it is wholly wrong. Maya descendants still inhabit the Yucatan, but the technology, religion, and practices of the ancient civilization must now be slowly exhumed and catalogued by archaeologists-a difficult task considering the Maya had no central ruling capital. If any kind of mission was conducive to a technically rational approach, it would be surgical strike missions.[xxxvii]. Inca architecture still dots the Andean mountains and highlands as the timeless endeavors of a lost people. He is a Ph.D. candidate at North Carolina State Universitys Public Administration program with special interest in researching the organizational obstacles within SOCOM and DoD to effective Irregular Warfare. But, this is a great example of where using CF terminology and philosophical constructs is hurting SOF: CF submits that tactical goes up to brigade level and even possibly division. Recently US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) introduced a new publication: the SOF Operational Design Handbook. QUOTE: "This was true for the SF of the 60/70s---the ability to "understand the mission, understand your enemy and understand yourself" before one is dropped in with no support from the outside world.. This goes back to your comments concerned SW vs what I call the glorious kick down the door mentality. (take it, figure out what to do with it, apply it). It will be a game changer if and when it happens, much like the Stinger was a game changer to some extent for the Soviets in Afghanistan. CF was so wrapped up in getting the cultural thing correct they knew nothing about swarming, AQI/IAI strategy which was coupled to their fighting tactics and the interrelationships between the various insurgent groups. It is beyond time that SOF headquarters be as special as the teams underneath them and offer those teams something more than what the conventional forces have developed for the physical domains. The goal of our young folks today -- via for example: diplomacy, development and defense -- is to undermine and eliminate the alternative ways of life and alternative ways of governance of the lesser and remaining states and societies and to, as in the case of the great powers above, replace these with ways of life and ways of governance which are more similar to our own. By its nature, the M2 WFF exists in the physical domains and inherently in close proximity to the threat and civilian elements. Maybe I'm just becoming cynical in my old age, but it bothers me to no end that so many great people and huge amounts national capital have been expended in basically accomplishing what? mation as a joint function is but the first step toward enhancing joint warfighting and developing a future joint force able to dominate in the conflicts of tomorrow. It is a way to conceptualize all the systems and tasks units must accomplish to be successful. The Int WFF includes all systems and capabilities involved in fulfilling the requirements of information management and the intelligence cycle. Farmers contrived chinampas, or artificial, fertile islands floating in canals, to grow crops of beans, peppers, avocados, tomatoes, and, most important, corn. Maya, like the Aztecs and Inca, also practiced human sacrifice. We shouldn't in my opinion be okay with the first time team guys do critical and creative thinking is on their first mission downrange. Participatory Observation is the (social anthropological) way, not governance, development, and security, and critical realism is the philosophy, not technical rationality and relying on operational methodologies.". Then, you as an institution began to see that the deep veins were there, all the time, never acknowledged because they never had to be. Most of the current inhabitants have only known ruin and violence and thus are understandably incapable of informing themselves as to what they want, let alone articulate such an abstract sentiment to a foreign infidel HT team. Its language is one of math and formulaic metaphor,[xvii] its logic is the scientific method, and its philosophy is of the Enlightenment Period. In Evaluating Immunities before a Special Tribunal for Aggression Against Ukraine, the Type of Tribunal Matters, Chinas Ferry Tale Taiwan Invasion Plan Is A Legal Nightmare, China Maritime Report No. and are likewise both required to understand it. Within this context, you then move to the more practical, scientific, logical, whatever you want to call it. Sustainment influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations and often determines what can actually be achieved. The distinction you explicitly make seems to detract from your deeper point. Because the underlying social rules and mechanisms are created by humans, they are constantly evolving over time and geography. The IA WFF is composed of all actions, systems and capabilities that contribute to the narrative produced by the force. The commander and staff leverage the intelligence enterprise, coach and train the intelligence core competencies, implement the operations and intelligence processes, and direct the intelligence effort through the intelligence capabilities. Since about 2010/2011 the Force feeling that MDMP was lagging has gotten back into it with a vengeance forgetting along the way the critical process of open fear free discussions regardless of how crazy in a trust environment. Since the "old" individual SF soldier as well founded in UW it was easy to shift between the various Projects, Mike Forces,and A Teams and one did not loss a single minute---AND one did not "feel" that one was being degraded if one shifted from say SR back to a CIDG team or to a Mike Force. SW forces would be engaged in social influence and, if savvy enough, they would be engaged in internalization efforts through participatory observation (encompassing action, observation, learning, and influencing- influencing both the observed and the observers). Just how many deploying BCTs were trained on the strategy and thinking of AQ---they did in fact have a strategy something the Army did not have and still AQ today drives on strategy ---recently updated as released in September 2013---how many CF personnel have read and understood every word of that General Guidance? The warfighting functions are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical- and operational-level commanders. Personally, I disagree. A SOF Design Guide or SOF Theory of Design may well be written one day, a guide that offers a non-technically rational approach to the human domain, but it remains to be seen if the requisite change can be driven through the bureaucracy that has for some time now resisted fundamental transformation. I have read and heard many who claim that the Army Warfighting Functions just create more red-tape and are not needed. In typical UW fashion he pulls his entire team together and they go over in detail all the circuits and devices---found nothing and went out to attempt it again. The scope of engagement may include Other Government Agencies (OGA), Non-Government Organisation (NGO), Host Nation (HN) Government, and key elements within the civil community in general. It teaches people the danger when they fail to observe their physical environment (under their ergonomic desk chair) and drives home the point that real pain (having your pants blown out of the roof of the shit-house) and pain on a TV screen have nothing in common. 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Even our own COIN doctrine- which implies that that type of activity is counterproductive, cannot rescue us from the technically rational system, of which it is, ultimately, also a part of. At every echelon of command, commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting functionthe related tasks and a system that enables . When I think of the human domain I think of Unconventional Warfare (UW)[xxiii], Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counter UW, insurgency, and the like. Thus, given this mission (outlier state and societal transformation) and this problem (the "enemy" can see us coming, so to speak, even before we get on the aircraft), how then might the art and understanding of the sublime help us to overcome these difficulties? It is ironic that the Aztecs grew flowers because. I am not overly familiar with the Mexico situation (some first-hand experience with Mexican army check points in the Baja California desert a few years ago notwithstanding). [xxvi] The tactical level (young NCOs and officers) seems in my experience to have largely remained mission-focused and results oriented. [xxix] This has resulted in the doctrine seeming to contradict itself. Can you imagine the reaction of the Indian authorities if you suggested they study Pakistani Punjab village culture in order to counter a repeat of the attack on the Taj Hotel and VT. Who says that a "human domain" warfighting function would solely be the domain of SF? The open-ended nature of part two however, puts you in a big 'ol pickle. He was surrounded by a gaggle of equally wide-eyed individuals of similar disposition that suggested to me ALQ had trawled the homeless shelters and shanty towns throughout the third world and southern Europe to get fighters. That strategy is to get more money. Others, such as Carl Builder, mentioned in footnote 12, as well as this authors own experiences highlight the bureaucratic pressures that lead to the chase for more money within government bureaucracies. A warfighting function (WFF) is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. It always struck me a little odd in a way because it was the first time in our history where anyone literally could come in off a mission and then sit down on a computer and talk with your wife, parents, friends etc. If SW was as important, the amount and quality of education that soldiers get who are involved in SW would be similar in per capita spending as those in SS get for their specialized training and equipping. B. I agree with your assessment, the way we use technology largely replaced our use of the M1E to gain a true understanding of our operational environment, so while we have better battle field awareness on a T.V. Everything indicates that as the world becomes more complex, unpredictable, uncertain and fragile, many of the institutions, such as formal democracy, the market, centralized justice, the banks, will become obsolete. and ask: a. [xii] See Carl Builders book, Masks of War, Johns Hopkins University Press, FEB, 1989, for a description of why the services act the way they do. [x] Of course, that does not leave too much left. The second is related to the first. "Social" facts can be analyzed too, just not in the way you might analyze, say, a set of temperature readings. Thus, we faced a problem: design pointed to our philosophy as being the problem, but we were wedded to our philosophy. Social learning-in-action would emphasize the requirement to learn while we are acting, although social entanglement (merging quantum entanglement with social efforts) might be more descriptive of the reality. You build that trustyou cant surge trust. And it goes to the point that one must understand one's enemy within that specific event as they are an agile portion of the population that one is concerned about and they have their reasons which we might not even begin to understand. The job, during this lull, seems to be related more to "building friends and influencing people" and building "trust" and building the capacity of local military, police and intelligence forces. I believe the system works but I would like to hear your opinion. The difference is that equipment is easy to count, education is not. This handbook borrowed much of its concepts from the Armys Design Methodology (ADM). The seven warfighting functions are command and control, fires, force protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. [xxv] The Village Stability Program incorporated into Afghanistan, starting out a very promising concept, was quickly seized upon by the bureaucracy and forced into a one-size-fits-all construct that ignored the need for local nuance. Grant-----maybe Ben Z might agree with the following ---I would venture that currently in the Force the use of MDMP in it's standard form does in fact kill critical thinking as one simply goes through the rote of doing the steps not the thinking behind the why one is doing each of the steps. We are convinced we can measure everything we do, to the extent that we talk about things like measures of effectiveness and measures of performance as if effectiveness is something one can always measure (the problem of sufficient causation and original causes). [vi] In almost every meeting the author has attended on the 7th WfF, this anecdote is repeated, so even if GEN Odierno never said it, it has become part of the institutional narrative that he did. Commanders plan, prepare, execute, and assess protection capability requirements throughout operations to shape, operations to prevent, large-scale ground combat operations, and operations to consolidate gains. Or to use the language of the military, your own assumptions. A critical distinction as it speaks to the heart of our general tendency to confuse technical proficiency with aptitude in problem solving, especially in complex environments. Taken from the www.borderlandbeat.com from today. Ultimately to achieve long term goals, a professional host nation military must exist and until it does the conventional force alone with Joint and SF assistance is required to provide combined arms maneuver and wide area securityto include influence of and assistance to people over wide areas. At some It is composed of those elements that seize, occupy, hold, and deny terrain, and the systems, capabilities and elements that facilitate those actions. In addition to having the most advanced medical and surgical techniques of the ancient Americas, the Inca constructed more than 12,00012,00012,000 miles of roadway and aqueducts to supply taxpaying and labor-contributing tribes throughout the empire. Law and the killing of a Russian propagandist: Some Q & A BY CHARLIE DUNLAP, J.D. All the while the SOF boys took on more and more of the smaller scale hunter-killer roles that while certainly physically and technically demanding, didn't seem all that "unconventional". Finally, how to understand "the oppressed" in terms of our political objective. In plain English, the 7 th WfF is all of the tasks and systems that military units would need to do or have to influence people, taking into account the "socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity". The human domain implies the social realm: a dominion of non-visible abstractions that, although mostly falling outside of the scientific are nonetheless real, if real means to have an effect on others. The HTS was a massively costly program for both the US Army and the taxpayer ---was a total waste of money---ie the Awakening was generated by AQI forking the Sunni insurgency not by anything Gen. P or Nagel did or what HTS provided in many badly written reports. We caught a break and rolled the entire team including their leader who I spent hours with---now the story takes a typical turn if one has been trained in UW as one would recognize exactly the same team processes we ran in SF in the 60s/70s. Since the purpose of military action is to affect the behavior of human groups in the operational environment toward a defined objective, the Army must improve the doctrinal representation of the operational environment and account for the socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity. Sydney J. Freeburg took the following thought from a Strategic Landpower Conference in August of this year: Strategically, that failure to understand the human factor is the root of the abject failure that the Army, Marines, and SOCOM are determined not to repeat.[xiii] This follows on the heels of the Armys Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual and subsequent debates between the COINdinistas, such as John Nagl who have pushed for a human-centricity in contemporary war efforts, and those who would advocate that the narrative being sold on Iraq is flat-out wrong. I know on some level it is important to teach the current doctrine. D. the Aztecs had no calendar to determine the best time to grow flowers. It discusses the role of the Marine Corps component commander and staff, their functions, and their relationships to the joint force commander and the other Service components. was steve backshall in the military, More red-tape and are not needed assigned by superior tactical- and operational-level commanders to... Aztecs and inca, also practiced human sacrifice can actually be achieved claim that the Aztecs flowers. Quite different offensive cyber operations kind of mission was conducive to a technically approach... By CHARLIE DUNLAP, J.D to the threat and civilian elements deeper point company pay h1b... The Aztecs had no calendar to determine the best time to grow flowers be achieved CIMIC ) more practical scientific... The problem, but we were wedded to our philosophy time and geography protection, information,,! The School of Advanced military Studies and South America had no calendar to determine best... 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